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In the present article a particular aspect of constitutional interpretation will be considered. This aspect is 
called "creative" and involves retrieving the meaning of an object of interpretation. It is with regard to this 
particular aspect or moment of interpretation that creativity is often viewed as something to be avoided, to 
be shunned. If the task at hand is to "retrieve" some meaning, then the idea that this meaning can be creat-
ed, in whole or in part, seems quite simply antithetical to the enterprise at hand. It suffices to note that many 
jurists and legal thinkers believe that interpretation as retrieval is an essential aspect of constitutional inter-
pretation. Constitutional interpretation, is shaped by the legitimating need to anchor decisions in authority. 
That is very much part of the legitimation structure of constitutional law—important not just to the citizenry, 
but to judges and to legal academics. Over the practice and the idea of constitutional interpretation have 
become marked with the forms of this legitimation structure. The notion then that judges would be creative 
in their interpretations seems antithetical to both the practice and the idea of legal interpretation. The intro-
duction of creativity in constitutional interpretation accordingly appears to deny the authority of authority. 
We begin with interpretation. We explore a number of complexities and conundrums. We 
end with creativity. 
Consider a certain aspect of constitutional interpretation that most jurists and legal think-
ers consider crucial to the interpretive enterprise. This I will call interpretation as retrieval. This 
aspect (which may or may not be pragmatically possible) involves retrieving the meaning of 
an object of interpretation—here the Constitution or one of its clauses. It is with regard to this 
particular aspect or moment of interpretation that creativity is often viewed as something to be 
avoided, to be shunned. 
Why? Because if the task at hand is to "retrieve" some meaning, then the idea that this 
meaning can be created, in whole or in part, seems quite simply antithetical to the enterprise at 
hand. It may be, of course, that the enterprise at hand—interpretation as retrieval—is not a co-
herent one, but we will bracket that. It suffices for now to note that many jurists and legal think-
ers—originalists as well as living constitutionalists— believe that interpretation as retrieval is 
an essential aspect of constitutional interpretation. 
Why retrieval? 
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Interpretation 
In an article published in 1996, Joseph Raz the eminent jurisprudential thinker asked, 
"Why Interpret?"1 Specifically he asked: Why do legal professionals engage in interpretation at 
all? The answer he proffered is as simple as it is convincing: The authority of law depends upon 
tracing its meaning to the authoritative sources. This tracing, in turn, is according to Raz, what 
we call "interpretation". 
But, of course, not any kind of interpretation will do. It must be a legal interpretation-that 
is to say, the kind of interpretation authorized and laid out by the law itself.2 And it is, of course, 
the kind of interpretation that is directed at its proper authoritative objects (not substitutes). 
Notice we have here the embryonic form of a small hermeneutic circle: The law must be 
interpreted, but its interpretation must be authorized by law itself—and often the very same law 
that is to be interpreted.3 
In this hermeneutic circle, any number of complexities might emerge. For instance, con-
sider the object of interpretation. As a concrete instance, take the United States Constitution. 
Just what is the object of interpretation here? It's the U.S. Constitution, of course. Certainly. But 
what is it? 
It's a writing 
It's an outline 
It's a charter 
It's a social contract 
It's a plan 
It's a plan to be redeemed 
It's a legal event 
It's a political act 
It's a delegation of authority 
It's an organic whole 
It's an inscription in positive law 
It's an approximation of higher law 
It's a bridge to the past 
It's an incorporation of the past 
It's a break with the past 
It's an anticipation of an inchoate future 
It's a legal document (like other legal documents) 
It's the establishment of a political-legal ontology that is itself constitutive of the state 
(broadly or narrowly understood) political community 
It's a combination of any these things and many more, some of the time, much of the time 
or all of the time. 
Notice that any interpretive strategy one might use — "heed the plain meaning of the text", 
"follow the framers' intent" — is woefully inadequate to specify which of these possibilities is 
1 Joseph Raz, "Why Interpret?", 9 RATIO JURIS (1996), 349. 
2 H. Jefferson Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent", 98 HARV. L. REV. (1985), 885. 
3 The vexatious character of this circle (cheery Gadamerian solutions aside) is encountered perhaps most 
acutely in constitutional interpretation. The reason is simple: The Constitution as its name indicates is supposed 
to be both constatively and performatively constitutive and paramount. This constitutive and paramount char-
acter would be severely impugned if it turned out that the modes of interpretation were ultimately authorized 
from elsewhere. For many American law students, Marbury v. Madison 3 U.S. (Cranch) 1 (1803) often serves as 
the primal and crucial encounter with this particular circle. 
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really and truly the right one. Even Chief Justice Marshall's emphatic statement, "It is a con-
stitution, we are expounding", is of no help-since, as many have demonstrated, a great many 
conflicting things arguably follow from that particular declamation.4 
Not only are there difficulties specifying or selecting the appropriate "method" of interpre-
tation, but perhaps more troublesome, it is not even clear what it is that is to be interpreted. 
This is the missing legal ontology: Just what is it that is being interpreted?5 
Notice too that if you put your mind to it (and even if you don't) any of the ostensible identi-
ties of the Constitution listed above can in the very act of reading refer you to any of the others. 
As one reads all sorts of hierarchies of identity can proliferate — each identity collapsing into or 
subsuming the others. Hence the constitution as "writing" can be subsumed within "the politi-
cal act" (or vice versa) which in turn can be subsumed within "the incorporation of the past" 
and so on and so forth in a manner at once terminable (because the interpretive quest must be 
abandoned at some point) and yet interminable (because one could go on). 
As you proceed in the reading, you may be impelled to discard any possible identity as quite 
simply impossible given recent advances i n . . [the academic specialty of your choice.] You 
may even be led to demand some degree of "coherence" or "rationality" as determinative of the 
identity of the instrument. On the other hand, you can also be led to jettison the touchstones of 
"coherence" and "rationality" in the name of authority. Hence, it could well be that, coherent or 
not, it is the framers or authors of the Constitution who have the last word. 
At some point, all of this may bring into play the question of who you are in this reading: 
Each change in the identity of the Constitution possibly brings about a change in your identity 
as an interpreter. 
Now, it might have seemed that, in constitutional law (or at least U.S. constitutional law) 
this particular complexity could have been avoided: One might have thought that, in the last 
analysis, it is "the court" who is the authorized interpreter. But, this move (aesthetically akin to 
giving the framers the last word) immediately collapses upon the realizations t h a t . . 
all manner of interpreters are authorized: courts, legislatures, we the people, etc. 
each of the authorized interpreters will, consciously or not, 
incorporate the contributions of the other interpreters 
each of these interpreters is an enablement or construct of the law itself 
and so on. 
Moreover, the very idea of the "court" as an authorized subject is itself but a reification of 
a more or less stable glomming-on of professional habits, political commitments, cognitive 
capacities, linguistic competencies, institutional arrangements, legal imperatives and delimita-
tions, etc. variously registering (or not) in a largely somewhat more/somewhat less mutable 
bio-site generally known as "the judge". The judge, in turn, is a creature of trained self-reifica-
tion — a self-reification that is more or less enduring, depending upon the judge's own juris-
prudential aesthetics, political commitments, cognitive abilities and his or her psychological 
location on a spectrum ranging from utter self-abnegation before the text of law at one end to 
free-form juridical adventurism on the other. 
This then, I would offer, as a very brief (and radically incomplete) sketch of "constitution-
al interpretation". This description may well seem positively alarming to legal and non-legal 
thinkers alike. Rest assured, however, that, in an overriding sense, the seemingly vertiginous 
hermeneutic possibilities uncovered above need not and in fact rarely come to pass. 
4 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1919). 
5 See, Thomas C. Grey, "The Constitution as Scripture", 37 STAN. L. REV. (1984), 1. 
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The reason is simple: Among all the dizzying ontological and hermeneutic possibilities, 
one of them is to reduce all the others to just one possibility. And as a contingent, but nonethe-
less dependable psycho-social matter, this is the path that judges will take (deliberately or not) 
almost all the time.6 In fact, much of the time, the judge does not even have to "reduce" the 
dizzying possibilities: he or she has been trained in law school not to see them in the first place.7 
Particularly among appellate judges, there will be a premium on such reductionist skills. 
Unlike literary critics or philosophers, judges do not have the luxury of ending on the note, 
"This is all so intractable. We just don't know what to believe."8 To the contrary, the appellate 
judge must end his or her legal opinion on a single monistic note — even if this monistic note 
has three parts, or ten parts or even if it entails remanding, or something of the sort.9 
So both in court and in the law school, the hermeneutic situation tends to be radically 
simplified. Indeed, most of the discussion and thinking on the issue take place within aesthetic 
constraints that might be described as a hermeneutic two-step:10 
First thing: Assume an object of interpretation (i.e. the constitution). 
Now, how should it be interpreted? 
This radical distinction between 1) a stable object of interpretation which all agree is the 
thing in issue and 2) the action of interpretation greatly simplifies the hermeneutic problem. 
For one thing this sharp object/interpretation distinction enables the participants to presup-
pose that they are all interpreting the same thing and are thus engaged in intelligible agree-
ments or disagreements about it's meaning. They may, of course, concede that as in the Hindu 
fable of the eight blind men and the elephant, their understanding of this particular elephant is 
partial. But, in at least some sense, they're all talking about an elephant (the authoritative object 
of interpretation) as opposed to a rhinoceros or God knows what.11 
I want to be fair and acknowledge that very often the actual steps in the interpretive enter-
prise are presented in a more sophisticated manner. Thus, legal thinkers (Dworkin comes to 
mind) will introduce elegant subtleties and nuances—spirals of law spiraling their way towards 
a law that works itself pure. Typically, however, such refinements come down to two other 
formulae: 
Increase the sophistication of the account of interpretation by multiplying the number of 
steps above (i.e. put in more than two). and/or 
Invoke and elaborate some sophisticated expression such as "integrity" or "redemptive" or 
"intimate relation" to refine the relations between object and interpretation. 
The problem with the first formula is that, in one sense, it is not discernibly different from 
the original hermeneutic two-step (i.e. Assume an object of interpretat ion.) Instead, it is sim-
ply the repetition of the same operation at multiple levels (i.e. more than two). In fairness, this 
formula does have the advantage of making articulate the complexity of considerations that can 
arise in the act of legal interpretation. It does not avoid the circularity we have encountered, but 
6 Robert Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Nomos and Narrative", 97 HARV. L. REV. (1983), 4. 
7 Stanley Fish, "Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory", 96 YALE L. J. (1987), 1773. 
8 Nothing, of course, prevents the legal academic from ending on such a note. But since most legal 
academics assume the persona and perspective of a judge, the fact is: they generally don't. 
9 If the judge does not end on a monistic note, there will be almost always a default rule in effect 
deployed by some other agent or agency that will render a determination that ends on a monistic note. 
10 An early and notable exception is Grey, op. cit. note 6. 
II Some participants realize, of course, that having interpreted the constitution differently, they have 
ended up with different constitutions. But, at the same time, each of them (so far as I can tell) claims to 
have interpreted the "right" one, the "real" one, the one that everybody else is and should be busy inter-
preting (however badly these other people may be botching the job). 
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at the very least it enacts a bigger, richer, more interesting circle and this may well be the best 
that we can get.12 
The problem with the second formula is that while it has the aura of intellectual respectabil-
ity and it is almost always deployed as if something positive were being offered, expressions like 
"mutually constitutive" seldom mean much beyond: "There's something of a relational nature 
going on here though what it is, we haven't much of a clue."13 That, of course, would be per-
fectly fine so long as the authors of those expressions emphasized the relative vacancy of their 
expressions. That, however, is almost never the case. More problematic perhaps is that despite 
the promising character of these expressions, there is absolutely nothing about them that guar-
antees reaching hermeneutic equilibrium as opposed to hermeneutic vertigo. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of "doing" constitutional interpretation and representing the en-
terprise as coherent, the hermeneutic two-step is a nice move. Or rather, to be more accurate, 
it's not so much a move as it is something judges and legal academics just simply do.14 
But as convenient as the hermeneutic two-step and its sharp distinction may be, they are 
haunted by problems. One problem is that it is not at all clear how one might go about deciding 
what belongs to interpretation and what belongs to its object. Between object and interpreta-
tion where and how is the distinction ("/") to be found or created? As between the object and 
interpretation, how can one tell one from the other? What belongs to each? And what non-
dogmatic, non-circular, non-infinitely regressive, non-self-decentering justification could one 
possibly give for the distinction? 
One might say, of course, that these are questions of philosophy not law. But that simply 
displaces and replicates the problem on a new substantive terrain. One immediately confronts 
the same form of questions: Between philosophy and law, where and how is the distinction ("/") 
to be found or established? As b e t w e e n . . (and so on). 
The short of it is, that try as one may, there is simply no privileged entry point into this problem. 
Hermeneutics, linguistic theory, political philosophy, historical inquiry—none offers a privileged 
entry point intellectually sufficient to triumph over the others. Each approach has some truly telling 
critique to offer against the others. But consistent with that recognition, each approach is itself com-
promised by the critiques offered by the others. Now one might say that this problem is so esoteric 
as to have no significance in day-to-day constitutional law. But that is wrong. The problem surfaces 
at the very heart of even the most basic exercises in constitutional interpretation. 
Once the interpretation/object distinction collapses and the object goes on ontological holi-
day, it becomes unclear whether anything terribly definitive can be said about constitutional 
interpretation. Instead, it begins to seem as if constitutional interpretation is 1) a confused, if 
not impossible, activity resting on a missing ontology... 2) while also an activity accomplished 
with great aplomb and confident rationality by jurists and legal academics in America and 
elsewhere. It is in short like baptism viewed from the perspective of the atheist: it doesn't exist, 
and there's way too much of it going on.15 
12 Moreover, it may well be that obfuscation is perversely functional. Cf. Thurman Arnold, Symbols of 
Government (Connecticut, New Haven, Yale University Press 1935). This, of course, would create a real 
ethical dilemma for law teachers who presumably would have some reticence to a knowing participation 
in an enterprise of mystification. 
13 There's nothing wrong with that last bit. Indeed, offered as a negative insight in an academic context 
over-saturated with positive (and sometimes unappealing) meaning, it's downright helpful. But that is 
seldom what is intended or understood. 
14 Fish, op. cit. note 8. 
15 While it would be too much to pursue the point here, the religious analogy above does raise the 
question whether interpretation in law, at least, does not harbor in its very form (even in its secular form) 
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In constitutional law in particular, the gap that separates these last two discordant descrip-
tions—constitutional interpretation as a woefully confused yet confidently rational endeavor— 
is often bridged by reference to politics,16 violence,17 authority,18 faith,19 conscience,20 etc. All 
these headings are deployed in ways that infuse the gap with the possibility of positive mean-
ing—ways of thinking about interpretation's identity and character that render it a cogent (even 
if not always an entirely innocent) enterprise.21 
While these terms serve as the headings for very different kinds of legal projects, the head-
ings are all rather intimately intertwined—at least so far as law is concerned. Invoke one of 
them in the decisions of law and the others are perforce implicated and effectuated as well. 
The risk with all these headings (politics, violence, etc.) is that one or some or all might be 
taken too seriously—as the answer to the interpretive predicament. Which would be intellectu-
ally unfortunate, because even as these headings point in different interpretive directions, they 
are nonetheless relatively empty. Nothing very definitive or elaborate has been (or can be said) 
about any of them. They designate realms or phenomena which largely escape rational order-
ing. To think at once deeply and non-reductively about politics, violence, authority, and faith is 
to reckon with their irreducibly non-rational character. Rationalize them (i.e. submit them to 
some ostensibly rationally ordered structure) and you will have missed them as well their roles 
in language, law and culture. 
Creativity 
What I would like to insist upon here by way of conclusion is the theme announced early 
in this essay and exemplified throughout. This would be the creative aspect in constitutional 
interpretation. I would not—given what has been said above—want to represent creativity as 
having any more substance than politics, violence, authority, faith, conscience or any other 
such heading. In fact, I would want to insist on something closer to the opposite—namely, that 
it is also a relatively empty and elusive concept. 
Why then insist on creativity at all? Because creativity is at once so absent from the juridical 
and academic accounts of constitutional interpretation and yet so evidently ineluctable in its 
practice. That the heading of creativity is so absent from juridical and legal academic discourse 
is not surprising. Indeed, its absence is explained by the first few paragraphs of this essay. Con-
stitutional interpretation, is shaped by the legitimating need to anchor decisions in authority. 
a residually theological structure. As secularists, this would leave us operating within quasi-theological 
forms devoid of the animating substance that once gave them life and meaning. We would be confronting 
the Nietzchean problematic of the death of god. It's safe to say that very few people in constitutional law 
have recognized this problematic, to say nothing of its immensity. 
16 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siecle) (Massachusetts, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
17 The violence of law here is much more the kind described by Robert Cover than by Jacques Derrida. 
Compare Jacques Derrida, "The Mystical Foundations of Authority", in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, 
and David Gray Carlson (ed.), Deconstruction and The Possibility of Justice (Routledge, Abingdon, 1992), 3 with 
Robert Cover, "The Violence of the Word", 95 YALE L. J. (1986), 1601-1629, 1610. 
18 Owen Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation", 34 STAN. L. REV. (1982), 739. 
19 Joseph Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Illinois, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1986); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (New Jersey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998). 
20 Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (New Jersey, Hoboken, Blackwell Publishing, 1991). 
21 These are "theoretical unspecifiables". For elaboration, see http://brazenandtenured.com/2011/10/23/ 
theoretical-unspecifiables/ 
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That is very much (at least in the United States) part of the legitimation structure of consti-
tutional law—important not just to the citizenry, but to judges and to legal academics. Over 
time (centuries) the practice and the idea of constitutional interpretation have become marked 
with the forms of this legitimation structure. The notion then that judges would be creative in 
their interpretations seems antithetical to both the practice and the idea of legal interpretation. 
The introduction of creativity in constitutional interpretation accordingly appears to deny the 
authority of authority. 
Yes it does.22 And yet here we are nonetheless. 
The judge creates the artifact (i.e. the constitution) that he is interpreting. Of course, he 
doesn't create it any which way. And the creation is not ex nihilo. And the creativity (like most 
creativity worth anything) is trained and informed. And the judge is most certainly not alone. 
Yet for all these qualifications, the creative moment seems intellectually undeniable.23 
Indeed, the creative aspect or moment seems undeniable even in the most creativity-denying 
jurisprudence. The judge, for instance, who believes he is bound by the framers' intent, has 
had to imagine law as the sort of thing that binds. And he has creatively chosen to follow that 
particular metaphor—binding. The judge who believes he is constrained by the limits of the 
constitution has had to invent a text with limits that constrains. He too has creatively chosen 
a particular metaphor—limits. The judge who believes that justice trumps the constitution is 
also using a particular metaphor— trump. All of these metaphors and images—these aesthetic 
representations of law and others as well—are creatively constructed. The only real difference 
among jurists and legal thinkers on this particular score is the degree to which they thoughtfully 
acknowledge and address this moment of constitutional creativity. 
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